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AUTHORITIES 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
in tl1" Matter of the Estate of 
PRANK CHASEL, Deceased. 
No. 19265 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Decedent's only child applied for informal, intestate 
probate of decedent's estate, and was informally appointed as the 
personal representative. Decedent's half-brother and two half-
sisters also applied for probate of an old will [Duchesne County 
Probate No. 1703], which probate decedent's son contested. In 
addition, decedent's son claimed there was a current will, that 
he could not locate, which made him the decedent's sole 
beneficiary. Litigation was threatened and to avoid the same, a 
family agreement was reached between decedent's half-brother, two 
half-sisters and his son, the personal representative. Final 
c,ettlement and distribution, based on this agreement, was 
cpproved by the court on July 31, 1981. 
Decedent's son was then made aware of at least three (3) 
subsequent wills to the one in Probate No. 1703, which were 
purportedly executed by the decedent, and based thereon, the 
µcrsonal representative attempted to set aside the informal 
»1 ol 1ate and the family agrement, so as to probate the most 
, 'flent of the newly discovered wills. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Decedent's half-brother and two half-sisters objected to the 
probate of the newly discovered wills, asserting that the Closing 
' Order of' July 31, 1981, was a formal order and that therefore the 
Statute of Limitations of three (3) months for admitting a new 
will to probate had run. Decedent's son claimed the informal 
probate had never been made formal, and that the Statute of 
Limitations of one year nad not run. 
The lower court held that the personal representative had 
obtained a "formal" order as opposed to an "informal" order, 
approving the settlement of the estate which had converted the 
probate from an "informal" to a "formal" proceeding. Thus, the 
closing "order," without requesting a change from informal to 
formal, was construed by the court to be a request for a "formal" 
closing. Based on the lower court's construction, the time for 
amending the final order had run before the motion to probate the 
newly discovered will was made. The lower court also held that 
there were insufficient grounds to set aside the family agreement 
which was the basis of the final settlement and order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The personal representative seeks the reversal of the 
dee is ion of the lower court, with a remand to the lower court 
directing it to find that the entire proceedings were informaL 
and to set aside the Informal Closing Order of July 31, 1981. 
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J 
toyether with the stipulation of the family and to admit the 
latrst newly discovered will to probate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Decedent died June 24, 1980. At the time of his death, 
decedent was unmarried and was survived by his only child, 
William Chasel. After a diligent search in which no will was 
readily found, decedent's son applied for informal appointment as 
personal representative, with the administration of the estate 
being intestate (See Record, p. 1). The informal appointment was 
approved (See Record, p. 5), and the personal representative 
proceeded to administer the estate. 
In addition, decedent's half-brother and two half-sisters 
filed probate number 1703, which contained a purported Last Will 
and Testament of the decedent and a claim that the personal 
representative had been adopted by a third party. The personal 
representative filed affidavits stating that he never had been 
adopted by anyone (See Record, p. 12, 14 and 15). Decedent's son 
made a further search for a purported will the decedent had 
reportedly made shortly before his death, but the son could not 
locate the same. Because the new will could not be located, and 
be 1 iev i ng he had no other route to follow so as to close the 
estate, a compromise family agreement was reached. The personal 
rPpresentative agreed to this settlement because of "pressure" 
0 nd mistake of fact as to the lack of existence of a current, 
unrf'voked will of the decedent (See Record p. 41). 
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The court entered an order approving the family agreement as 
per U.C.A., §75-3-1101. The court then approved the finaJ 
distribution and settlement in this probate proceedings on July 
31, 1981 (See pp. 35 & 39). 
No. 1703 ~as to be dismissed. 
Pursuant to said agrement, Probate 
After six ( 6) months, but before one ( 1) year had passed, 
the personal representative located his father's Last Will and 
Testament at the law office of Fowler and Roe in Salt Lake City. 
Immediately the personal representative moved to set aside the 
informal probate and for the court to admit the newly discovered 
will to probate (See Record P. 50). The decedent's half-brother 
and half-sisters objected to this action and filed a motion for 
an order compelling the personal representative to comply with 
the closing order (See Record p. 51). 
The court denied the personal representative's motions, 
holding that the order approving the family settlement had 
converted the proceeding from an informal probate to a formal 
probate, and therefore, under §75-3-412(3)(a), the time in which 
the court could entertain a petition to probate another will had 
passed. 
From this ruling, the personal representative has appealed 
to this court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. TllE ORDER OF THE COURT APPROVING THE FAMILY 
SETTLEMENT DID NOT CONVERT THE PROCEEDINGS 
FROM AN INFORMAL PROBATE TO A FORMAL PROBATE 
A probate proceeding in Utah may take one of two forms, 
formal or informal. Informal probate is covered by §75-3-301 et. 
seq. Formal probate is covered by §75-3-401 et. seq. The Utah 
Supreme Court has never been required to consider or 
differentiate a formal probate from an informal probate. The 
comment following §75-3-302 equivocates an. informal probate to 
the common law probate in "common form" and a formal probate to 
the common law probate in "solemn form." The comment states that 
informal probate is probate of a simple will which generates no 
controversy. 
Probate in solemn form is typified by an adversial hearing 
with notice to all interested parties, and each interested party 
has the opportunity to appear. Probate in the common form is 
generally an ex parte hearing with-- only the will proponent or 
personal representative present. It is uncontested and quick. 
~ ~ Estate of Ross, Or~· 548 P.2d 1001 (1976), 95 C.J.S. 
Wills §318, 80 ArnJur 2d §1037. 
U.C.A., §75-3-1101 provides the mechanics for the court to 
enter an order recognizing a family settlement. It is not 
included in Part 3 - Informal Probate or Part 4 - Formal Testacy 
Ptoceedings. It is simply a method to provide judicial review of 
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family settlements in order to insure that they are fair and 
reasonable and to provide a judicial order to aid in the 
enforcement of family settlements. Bean v. Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 
309, 445 P. 2d 144 ( 1968), Muncey ~ Children's Home Finding ~ Aid 
Society, :Idaho, 360 P.2d 586 (1962). In re Estate of Harper, 202 
Kan., 150, 446 P.2d 738 (1968), 80 AmJur 2d §llOO. 
The very nature of a family settlement is informal, 
therefore, the need of a judicial order commemorating it. The 
reasons behind providing an actual court order would also suggest 
that a family settlement is an informal way of settling estates 
so as to avoid becoming involved in a formal judicial hearing. 
To say that a family settlement turns an informal probate into a 
formal probate contravenes logic. The only possible 
justification for this position is that §75-3-llOl states, "A 
compromise of any controversy if approved in a formal 
proceeding in the court for that purpose, is binding on all the 
parties thereto All court proceedings are formal, 
including informal probate, in the sense that they are official, 
on-the-record proceedings. That is what is meant in §75-3-1101. 
For §75-3-1101 's "formal proceedings" to be a formal probate, 
then under §75-3-401, et. seq., a full, adversial hearing would 
have to be held in which all parties to the family settlement are 
given the opportunity to appear and be heard, with the judge 
making the final decision as to what the final settlement should 
be. 
In this case, the personal representative 'presented the 
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settlement, along with all the other papers required for probate. 
No not ices were given, and the personal representative "waived• 
his right to notice. The judge may have reviewed the agreement 
to, see if on its face it was fair, reasonble, accurate, etc. 
Then the court issued the "order" approving the distribution of 
Frank Chasel's estate, including the family settlement, as 
presented. All of this was done ex parte. Only the personal 
representative proffered any documents. There was no formal, 
adversial hearing. There was no controversy for the court to 
resolve. It was uncontested and quick. It was an informal 
probate of Frank Chasel's estate. 
The only controversy was in Probate Number 1703. The record 
is clear, decedent's half-brother and two half-sisters never 
contested Probate Number 1698. They did file Notices of Waiver 
(see record pp. 10, 11). However, the family settlement 
el irnina ted any possible controversy. Had the interested parties 
wished a formal probate, they could have filed a petition 
requesting one in accordance with §75-3-402, or. they could have 
E iled the settlement in Probate Number 1703.- No one did so, 
therefore, all parties acquiesced to the informal probate. 
II, THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE RESCINDED 
AND THE PROBATE SET ASIDE BECAUSE IT WAS 
BASED ON A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT 
The law favors compromise and settlement of disputes and 
yenerally, parties are not allowed to repudiate their settlement 
agreement. However, compromise settlements may be set aside on 
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the grounds of mutual mistake of fact, as with any contract. 
In the present case, the family settlement was entered into 
on the basis of mistaken facts. Neither party knew of the 
whereabouts of the later discovered will or even if one actually 
existed.' If the existence of that will had been known by the 
parties, then the will would have been offered for probate and 
the agreement would have never been entered into. The family 
settlement was based on an assumption of fact which, unbeknowns 
to both parties, was not true, i.e., the belief that there was no 
current will. That mistake was material and mutual. Therefore, 
the agreement should be set aside and the newly discovered wills 
admitted to probate. 
No innocent purchasers without notice are involved, 
therefore, no innocent party will be prejudiced by the admission 
of the later wills to probate. 
III. THE PROBATE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE 
THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT WAS PROCURRED 
BY PRESSURE AMOUNTING TO DURESS 
An order of the probate court based on a family settlement 
is a judgment by consent. It can also be abrogated if the family 
settlement is obtained by fraud or duress. It is widely accepted 
principle of law, that it is not duress to threaten to do that 
which one has a legal right to do, i.e., threaten to litigate a 
claim asserted in good faith. Weathered v. Weathered, Kan. 224 
P.901 (1924). Doernbecher v. Mutual Life Insurance Company~ 
New York, Wash. 132 P.2d 751 (1943). 
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HEe Ho, Hawaii, 371 P.2d 379 (1962). 17 AmJur §892. 
In Weathered v. Weathered, op.cit., the court found fraud, 
duress and undue influence and ordered that the family settlement 
contract be set aside because persons who were pretending to act 
1ri the capacity of friends, protectors and advisors, but who were 
working in their own interest or in the interest of someone else, 
'advised" the plaintiff to sign the settlement. 
The personal representative was young and impressionable. 
_His uncle had alleged he was not his dad's- son, had been adopted, 
and then put pressure on him to settle the estate, telling him he 
was "greedy" to want it all. Also his own lawyer told him that 
he had to settle. He was led to believe he had no other option, 
and that he would lose everything if he did not sign the 
settlement. Not knowing the location of the current will, the 
personal representative relied upon those representations and 
signed the settlement. 
CONCLUSION 
The informal probate procedure in §75-3-301 et seq. was 
meant to provide a procedure for avoidance of a formal, time 
consuming judicial hearing in the absence of controversy. The 
provision for judicial recognition of family settlements in S75-
3-IIOI is based on the same reasoning. Both are meant to provide 
a judicial procedure to recognize the settlement and distribution 
of a decedent's estate where there are no contests, no 
ccintroversies, and no need for a full-blown adversial judicial 
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hearing. Therefore, logic would seem to demand the conclusion 
that a family settlement is an informal probate. 
Because of the presence of the newly dis cove red wi 11, the 
mutual mistake of fact which constituted the basis of the family 
' settlement and the pressure exerted on the personal 
representative in order to gain his consent to the family 
settlement, the previous probate of Frank Chasel 's estate should 
be set aside and the newly discovered will admitted to probate. 
DATED this 7th day of October, 1983. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the 7th day of October, 1983, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF, postage prepaid, to Raymond A. Hintze, WALKER, HINTZE and 
WASHBURN, Attorney for Respondent (Chasel, Iorg and Rogers), 4685 
Highland Drive, Suite 202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117; by 
depositing the same in the United States Post Office at 
Roosevelt, Utah. 
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